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CABLE, COMPETITION, AND THE COMMISSION
FrankJ. Kahn*

Twenty-five years ago -there arose a few innovative business enterprises in
scattered rural sections of the nation. They were called "community antenna
television systems." Their function was to provide paying subscribers with access to the programming of the approximately 100 television stations operating during the 1948-52 Federal Communications Commission's "freeze."'
These early CATV systems supplied the same service to the country resident
that apartment building master antenna systems offered the city dweller,
namely, a better television picture.
Today CATV is called "cable television." Although CATV's functions
remain primarily to receive and distribute off-the-air television station
signals, the system often provides its subscribers with more than just a clear
picture. CATV expands the number of receivable signals by using microwave relay to import signals of television stations too distant to be received
off-the-air. It provides channels that are programmed independently of
television stations, and a small proportion of cable systems offer a form of
pay-as-you-see programming, or "pay cable." In addition, cable has the
technological potential to distribute simultaneously a virtually unlimited
number of audio-visual signals; to serve as a two-way communication device;
to replace the gas, electric, and water meter reader; to act as an electronic
day and night watchman; to ameliorate the energy shortage by making it
unnecessary for many to travel to work or store or polling place; and to
develop into a flexible communications system that could be used concurrently for mass communication and interpersonal communication.
Professor DeFleur has observed that each successive mass communication
medium has diffused through American society more rapidly than its prede* Associate Professor and Director of Mass Communication, Herbert H. Lehman
College of the City University of New York. B.A., Queens College, 1958; M.S., Syracuse University, 1961; Ph.D., New York University, 1967.
1. From 1948 through 1952 the Federal Communications Commission granted no
new permits for television channels. This freeze on the granting of permits was imposed
because of the recognition that a new television allocation and assignment plan was
needed. With only 12 VHF channels for the country, care had to -be taken to avoid
interference among stations. For a more detailed description of the freeze, see S. HEAD,
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA, 194-96 (2d ed. 1972).
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cessors. 2 For example, television gained popularity almost as soon as its
postwar reintroduction in the late 1940's; by the end of 1952 almost one-half
of all Americans had a television set in their homes. Radio broadcasting diffused more slowly than television. The motion picture was slower yet, and the
newspaper diffused least rapidly. It may seem strange, then, that in 25 years
CATV has reached only about 15 percent of the households in the United
States.3
The apparent enigma is explained partially by the natural reluctance of CATV operators to lay cable in the most sparsely populated
sections of their service areas. 'But this explanation is untenable in view of
the high probability that concentration on, and successful penetration of, the
more densely populated sections of rural America and urban areas would
produce rapid diffusion that would come to include all but the most remote
regions of the nation. Concentration on areas of high population density
would enhance rather than curtail CATV's rapid spread. A better explanation for its slow penetration is that CATV failed to offer a sufficiently
attractive service to enough people to permit faster diffusion. For a city
dweller who can adequately receive three or more television stations off-theair, slightly improved signal quality is not a persuasive incentive to subscribe
to cable. Unless CATV systems could offer more to the potential urban
subscriber, cable's growth would be greatly inhibited. Additional factors
which help to explain cable's slow spread are the recent high cost of raising
capital, the pricing of CATV services, and the difficulty of negotiating with
apartment house owners in the cities. But while -these factors have contributed to short term decelerations of CATV's growth, the major impediment to
faster development of the medium has been the Federal Communications
Commission.
The FCC enacted rules regulating cable television for the first time in
1965. 4 Significant new rules were issued in 1966, 5 1969,6 and 1972. 7 Each
new set of rules has been more restrictive and coercive than the prior set,
and more rules are expected at this writing.8 This article will not trace the
regulatory progression from the early compulsory carriage and nonduplication requirements of 1965 to the imposition of quasi-licensing procedures
2. M. DEFLEUR, THEORIES OF MASS COMMUNICATION, 74-75 (2d ed. 1970).
3. BROADCASING, April 14, 1975, at 56.
4. First Report and Order on Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
5. Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).

6. First Report and Order on CATV Rules, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
7. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, reconsidered, 36 F.C.C.2d
326 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 20402, 52 F.C.C.2d 87 (1975).
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and mandatory "access" channel capacity in 1972; rather, it focuses on
the development of the rationale which led to the FCC's assumption of
jurisdiction over CATV, for this early evolution of public policy has continued to shape subsequent Commission actions.
I.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS

The speedy growth of CATV in response to public demand for television
service during and immediately after the 1948-52 "freeze" prompted the
FCC to make its first official mention of CATV in 1953:
The rapid development of so-called community antenna systems
to bring TV programs to weak signal areas poses interference problems and the question whether such services constitutes [sic] common carrier or some other operation which comes within the Commission's jurisdiction. These antenna do not transmit on the air,
but pick up programs and send them by coaxial cable to the homes
of subscribers. 10
Some CATV systems were already using microwave relay facilities to import
distant signals at this time.
In 1954,11 the Commission continued to study whether CATV systems
were subject to FCC jurisdiction and particularly whether such systems were
common carriers,' 2 but the issue was still unresolved by 1956 when the first
formally noted economic injury protest against CATV was filed by a group
of 13 broadcasters against 288 CATV system operators. 13 The Commission
considered the matter for another two years, as more CATV systems were
constructed 14 and additional protests were initiated by broadcasters. 15
Economic injury was a familiar concept to the Commission. Prior to the
1940's, the FCC had considered economic injury protests made by existing
AM station licensees intervening to protest new station applications.' 1
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 19 FCC ANN. REP. 98 (1953).
11. At this time there were approximately 300 CATV systems serving more than
150,000 subscribers. 20 FCC ANN. REP. 93 (1954).
12. Id. at 92. The Commission noted, however, that at that time it did require "that
all wired TV systems be operated so as to not cause harmful [electricall interference
to regular radio services." Id. at 93. Common carriers, which are defined in 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1970), are regulated under 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-23 (1970).

13. 22 FCC ANN. Rm. 40 (1956). The broadcasters were seeking "to have the
Commission exercise jurisdiction over such systems as common carriers." Id.
14. By 1957 it was estimated that over 500 CATV systems were in operation, serving
500,000 homes. 23 FCC ANN. REP. 112 (1957).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Fall River Herald News Publishing Co., 5 F.C.C. 377 (1938).
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Following the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station,'7 however, the Commiiission refused to consider economic injury
protests until July 1958 when, in Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,18 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the FCC must hear and decide such protests when a licensee substantiated
the claim that financial hardship stemming from increased competition from
a new station would cause detriment to the public interest through "diminution or destruction of service." 10
The first FCC decision involving economic injury arising from CATV was
handed down in January 1958.20 Intermountain Microwave had been
granted permission by the FCC to construct supplemental microwave facilities to transport distant television signals to a distribution point for three
Montana CATV systems. The Hill County TV Club of Havre, Montana,
operator of two translators in north central Montana, petitioned the FCC
for rescission of ithe grant on grounds that the introduction of live network
programming in the petitioner's area posed "a direct threat to its investment
through possible loss of voluntary contributions necessary for its continued
operation" '2' and that the operation of community antenna television
systems might adversely affect the operations of a Great Falls, Montana
station whose programs petitioner rebroadcast through its translators. Additionally, Hill County alleged that Intermountain's supplemental facilities
might "inhibit the introduction . . .of improved or other broadcast facilities."' 22 In denying relief to the petitioner, the Commission invoked its preCarroll interpretation of the Sanders Brothers doctrine and, relying on its
1950 decision in The Voice of Cullman 2 3 stated:
The petition before us establishes only that Hill County may be
financially injured as a result of our grant to Intermountain Microwave. Such injury, as we have indicated, confers upon Hill County
standing to petition for reconsideration under section 405 of the
17. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). In Sanders Brothers, the Court held that in ruling upon
an application for a broadcast license, the FCC is not required to weigh the resulting
economic injury to a rival station except as that injury affects the public convenience,
interest or necessity. Id. at 473.
18. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See generally Kahn, Regulation of Intramedium "Economic Injury" by the FCC, 13 J. BROADCAsTiNO 221 (1969).
19. Id. at 443.
20. Intermountain Microwave, 24 F.C.C. 54 (1958).
21. Id. at 56.
22. Id.
23. L.E. Duffey (The Voice of Cullman), 14 F.C.C. 770 (1950). "[Als a matter of
policy, the possible effects of competition will be disregarded in passing upon applications for new broadcast stations." Id. at 776.
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But injury to Hill County is not

necessarily injury to the public. . .

The allegations of injury to

the public, as a consequence of economic injury to petitioner...
are too speculative to form the basis of any rational judgment ....
We can find no reason to attempt to deprive the public of a choice
24
between competing modes of television service.
Two months later, the FCC similarly rejected a television station's request
that the Commission vacate its grant of permits to extend certain microwave
facilities relaying television programs to CATV systems; the television
station had alleged that the grant would "enable CATV to enjoy an enhanced
25
competitive position in relation to the service of [the] protestant."
Finally, in April 1958, the Commission adjudicated the economic injury
protest action which had been brought before the FCC two years earlier. 2 0
The complainants asserted that the Commission should subject CATV
systems to common carrier regulation because such operations tend to defeat
the objectives of the FCC's Sixth Report and Order27 through economic injury to local broadcast stations. Plaintiffs alleged that because advertisers
would be reluctant to duplicate coverage they already received over CATV,
the CATV systems would diminish the revenue available to establish local
stations. Additionally, the complainants alleged that for the same economic
reasons, the presence of CATV in an area affected both the quality of
programming and the construction of satellite stations, and that "since 'the
physical limitations of CATV systems do not make it economical for them to
serve rural areas ...such systems by their adverse effect on the establish-

ment of local TV stations and satellites deprive such rural areas of any
television service whatsoever. '2 8 The CATV systems involved in the complaint denied that they were common carriers or that they were "responsible
for the economic plight of local television stations," and maintained that they
29
were "performing a beneficial public service."
The FCC found that it could not regulate CATV systems as common
carriers because -the specific system signals are, of necessity, determined by
the CATV itself rather than by subscribers. 30 The Commission speculated
24. 24 F.C.C. at 57-58.
25. Montana Microwave Co., 24 F.C.C. 231, 233 (1958).
26. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958). See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
27. Sixth Report and Order on Television Broadcast Services, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905
(1952).

28. 24 F.C.C. at 253.
29. Id.

30. Id. at 254. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has affirmed the Commission's determination that the Communications Act of
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that even if it were possible to regulate CATV systems as common carriers, it
would be impossible to control entry or operation to protect or foster
television broadcasting under the common carrier provisions of the Communications Act.A1 The FCC also noted that the CATV systems could not be
regulated under the broadcasting provisions of the Act because wire transmission was involved, rather than radio transmission. 32 Accordingly, the
broadcasters' complaint was dismissed.
II.

EXPLORING FOR JURISDICTION

The FCC considered the general policy questions posed by CATV's
impact on broadcasting in a study published in April 1959. 3 3 The Commis-

sion found that "there is a likelihood, or even a probability, of adverse
economic impact from auxiliary services [such as CATV] upon regular
television stations," 34 but concluded that due to the insufficiency of data, it
was not justified in taking action, or seeking authority to bar CATV's
36
growth.3 5 In light of the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Carroll,
however, the Commission determined for the first time that economic injury
to a local television station could be a valid public interest justification for
37
denial of authorization to a competing auxiliary service.
The Commission also affirmed its previous view that the Communications
Act of 193438 did not confer jurisdiction upon it to regulate CATV systems
1934 does not authorize regulation of CATV as a common carrier. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
31. 24 F.C.C. at 255. The Commission noted that "[a]lthough CATV systems, as
common carriers, might be subject to the rate-making and other conventional regulatory powers of the Commission, such systems in most instances would not be required
to obtain any authorization or certification from the Commission prior to commencement of operation ...... Id. The Commission cited, for example, 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)
(1970). That section, which has not been amended since 1958, controls the construction of new lines and extension of old lines. It exempts all lines within a single state
(unless any line constitutes part of an interstate line) and all local, branch or terminal
lines not exceeding 10 miles in length from obtaining certification from the Commission.
32. 24 F.C.C. at 255-56. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
33. Report and Order on CATV & TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
34. Id. at 423.
35. Id. at 424. The Commission did, however, take a small step towards claiming
authority over CATV systems in finding that the microwave carriers that serve CATVs
are, as licensees of the FCC, subject to its jurisdiction. Id. at 434.
36. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra.
37. 26 F.C.C. at 434-35. The Commission emphasized, however, that "in arriving at
this answer, all we say is that . . .we will take into account-when and to the extent
that it can be established-such adverse economic impact." Id. at 435.
38. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in scattered sections of
15, 47 U.S.C.).
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either as common carriers or under 'the broadcasting provisions, and further,
that neither its "plenary power" over communications, "property right"
concepts implied by the rebroadcasting provisions of the Act,3 9 nor the fact
that CATV exercised a substantial adverse economic impact upon broadcasting constituted an adequate basis "for asserting jurisdiction or authority over
CATVs, except as we already regulate them under part 15 of our rules with
respect to their radiation of energy."' 40 The Commission expressed
its intention, however, to seek congressional legislation requiring CATV systems -to secure the permission of any television station whose signals were
transmitted by CATV to subscribers and to carry local television stations'
41
signals without degradation at the request of such stations.
The FCC submitted its legislative proposal to Congress, 42 but CATV
interests were simultaneously seeking legislation 43 to bring cable operators
under FCC control in order to end broadcaster harassment of CATV and
eliminate "pressures by state public utility commissions to assert jurisdiction
over TV cable companies."' 44 The CATV-sponsored bill was amended by
the Senate Communications Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce after hearing from broadcasting interests. The original CATV proponents then opposed the amended measure since it would
have provided more stringent regulation than had initially been proposed. 45
Hearings were held in 1959,4 6 and in May 1960, the bill reached the floor
of the Senate, but was ultimately recommitted to committee by a vote of 3938, 4 7 after what appeared to be a lobbying contest between the CATV and
broadcasting factions. 48 In January 1961, the FCC proposed legislation
39. 47 U.S.C. § 325 (1970) provides in part:
(a) No person ... shall knowingly utter or transmit ... any false or fraudulent signal of distress . . . nor shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast the
program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express
authority of the originating station.
40. 26 F.C.C. at 431.
41. Id. at 441.
42. See S. 1801, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 6748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). For a short description of these bills, see 25 FCC ANN. REP. 32-33 (1959).
43. See S. 2303, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
44. Kroeger, Community Antenna Television: Friendor Foe?, TELEVISION MAGAZINE,
June 1962, at 85.
45. See S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
46. Hearingson S. 1739, S. 1741, S. 1801, S. 1886, and S. 2303 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I & 2 (1959).
47. 106 CONG. REC. 10547 (1960).
48. See James, The Growing Snarl in Wired TV, TELEVISION MAGAZINE, Sept. 1965,
at 42, 45. See also D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA
CONTROL, 101-11 (1973).
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which would have granted it limited rulemaking authority over CATV
49
systems. The proposal was never reported out of committee.
III.

ASSERTING JURISDICTION: THE RISE OF PROTECTIONISM

The Commission's first ad hoc assumption of CATV jurisdiction occurred
in 1962, when it reversed the initial decision of its hearing examiner and
denied the application of Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation to
build microwave facilities to provide additional service to CATV systems in
Riverton, Lander, and Thermopolis, Wyoming. 50 The grant was opposed on
the ground of economic injury by KWRB-TV, the only television station
located in Riverton.
KWRB-TV served almost 37,000 people, and covered an area of 13,845
square miles. The FCC found the station's operations to be in the public
interest, especially insofar as it served community needs through its local
programs. Although the station had operated at a loss since its inception, 5
KWRB-TV had hopes of eventually showing a profit. In fact, the gap
between its operating expenses and revenues had become progressively
smaller during successive years of operation. ,Part of the station's success in
competing with the CATV systems operating in its sparsely populated service
area was attributed to the fact that the station's picture was clearer than the
pictures transmitted by the CATV systems. Hence, the station was afraid
that if the microwave application were granted, the resulting expanded and
improved CATV service would ultimately increase the gap between its
expenses and revenues.
The Commission agreed with KWRB-TV's economic injury contention
and found that the granting of the application would place the station in a
difficult position since it would be unable to demonstrate to a potential
advertiser that a viewer was watching a program on KWRB-TV instead
of on another channel supplied by CATV. The station's one advantage,
a clearer picture, would be removed if the CATV systems could receive
microwave signals. The FCC found that a grant to Carter Moun49. See H.R. 6840, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); S. 1044, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961). See also 31 FCC ANN. REP. 81 (1965).
50. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962).
51. One reason given for the operating losses was-the competition-of CATV- It was
found that the station derived a disproportionately large share of its revenue from towns
in which CATV had made no serious inroads into the television market. For example,
the town of Lander contributed almost six times the amount of revenue to KWRBTV as did the town of Worland, even though the population of Worland was larger than
that of Lander. This was attributed to the fact that in Worland as many as 75 percent
of the homes were CATV subscribers.

Id. at 463.
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tain would result in the demise of KWRB-TV. In denying Carter Mountain's
application, the Commission reasoned that:
A grant of this application will not contemplate an extension of
coverage for the entire area included in KWRB-TV's contours,
since it is too costly for CATV to enter the rural areas. Thus, the
rural people would be left with -nothing at all. .

.

.

In this in-

stance, if KWRB-TV, -the local outlet, should be forced to cease
operation, the rural people would be left without any service. We
do not agree that we are powerless to prevent the demise of the
local television station, and the eventual loss of service to a substantial population .

. .

. Thus, after weighing the public interest

involved in Carter's improved facility against the loss of the local
station, it must be concluded, beyond peradventure of a doubt, the
need for the local outlet and the service which it would provide
to outlying areas outweighs the need for improved service which
Carter would furnish .... 52
The FCC indicated that it would look favorably upon Carter Mountain's
reapplication if it showed that KWRB-TV would be carried by the CATV
systems and that the systems would not duplicate network programs carried
3
by KWRB-TVA
After the Commission denied its petition for reconsideration, "4 Carter
Mountain appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 55 The court dismissed the argument that the Commission was in
effect regulating CATV without statutory authority by requiring Carter
Mountain to carry the local station's service and to not duplicate programming
as a condition of approving its application. The court reasoned that
because the conditions would not be imposed if Carter Mountain could show
that "the threatened damage to the local station would not in fact occur,"
the Commission was not attempting to regulate the CATV system even
though it may have had an indirect effect on that system.5 6
Carter Mountain is highly significant in that it permitted the FCC 'to get its
foot in the door after first having disclaimed jurisdiction and then having been
denied the regulatory authorization it requested from Congress. By depending
heavily on the economic injury aspect in Carter Mountain, the Commission
disregarded its established policy of avoidance (except for UHF-TV protec52. Id. at 465.
53. Id.
54. 32 F.C.C. 1181 (1962).
55. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
56. Id. at 363-64.
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tionism) in intramedium economic injury and its absence of policy in intermedia economic injury. 57 Standing alone, this would be of minor importance.
But Carter Mountain did not stand alone for very long.
The FCC proposed rules imposing conditions on Business Radio Service
microwave grants serving CATV systems in December 1962,58 and for
common carriers in the Domestic Point-to-Point Microwave Relay Service a
year later. 59 During the pendency of these rulemaking proceedings (which
resulted in the adoption of rules in 196560), the Commission refused to make
microwave grants serving CATV systems unless applicants agreed to abide
by the conditions contained in the proposed rules."' CATV systems
served by microwave had to carry local television station signals "without
material degradation" and refrain from duplicating the programs of local
stations for a period of 30 days before and after local broadcast. 2 Both
conditions were applicable only if the local television station requested them,
however.
Among the many comments filed with the FCC during the rulemaking
proceeding was the Fisher Report,6 3 a study of the economic impact of
CATV competition on commercial television broadcasting stations. Using
data derived from American Research Bureau studies, the FCC, and the
National Community Television Association, Professor Fisher performed
57. The Commission's inconsistency in economic injury matters is treated in Kahn,
Economic Injury and the Public Interest, 23 FED. COM. B.J. 182 (1969).
58. 27 Fed. Reg. 12586 (1962). The proposed rules provided in part that when a
CATV system operates within the predicted Grade A contour of any television station
in operation, "the CATV system must not duplicate simultaneously or 30 days prior
or subsequent thereto a program broadcast by such television broadcast station, provided the CATV operator has received at least 30 days advance notification from
the broadcast station licensee of the date of such broadcast." Further, if requested
by such television station, the CATV system must carry the signal of such station without any material degradation of quality. Id. at 12586-87.
59. 28 Fed. Reg. 13789-91 (1963).
60. First Report and Order on Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 741 (1965),
deleted, 34 Fed. Reg. 6526 (1969), modified and incorporated in part, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1
(1974).
61. 38 F.C.C. at 685; 31 FCC ANN. REP. 82 (1965). This interim procedure was
impliedly sanctioned by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Wentronics, Inc. v. FCC, 331 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
62. 27 Fed. Reg. 12587 (1962). The period for nonduplication was reduced to 15
days in the final version. First Report and Order on Microwave-Served CATV, 38
F.C.C. 683, 743 (1965), deleted, 34 Fed. Reg. 6526 (1969). See note 80 & accompanying text infra.
63. Fisher, The Impact of CATV Competition on Local Television Stations, Oct. 26,
1964. The Fisher Report was prepared for the National Association of Broadcasters
by economist Franklin M. Fisher of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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statistical analyses that showed high correlations between television station
65
64
and between station revenues and expenses.
audiences and revenues,

Based on these data and other findings, Professor Fisher calculated the
"average effects of CATV competition" on 127 stations located in one- and
two-station markets and found that a local station's revenues could be
reduced as much as $14,000 a year for every 1,000 television homes subscribing to CATV. 66 The report concluded that CATV penetration of tele67
vision markets can have serious impact upon television station profits.
An economic consultant to the FCC, Martin H. Seiden, issued a
report in 1965 which contradicted some of the findings of Professor Fisher.6 8
Seiden's report considered the contents of ,the Fisher Report and data
concerning 86 stations that experienced a decline in local revenue in
1963, and concluded that "CATV penetration has not been a direct cause of
declining [broadcast] revenue." 6 9 Seiden added, however, that at the present
time CATV exerts an indirect economic impact on small television stations,
owing in part to biases in audience rating surveys, and that in the future a
64. Id. at 21-30.
65. Id. at 31-37.
66. Professor Fisher calculated that:
1. For every additional 1000 TV homes, formerly able to view only the local
station, which subscribe to a CATV not carrying the local station, that station's
annual revenue is reduced on the average by a minimum of $14,000....
2. For every additional 1000 TV homes, formerly able to view both the local
station and another, which subscribe to a CATV not carrying the local station,
the local station's annual revenue is reduced on the average by a minimum of
almost $8,000 or about one-third of average net profits for the smaller stations.
3. For every additional 1000 TV homes, formerly able to view only the local
station, which subscribe to a CATV carrying the local station with average duplication, that station's annual revenue is reduced on the average by a minimum of $9,400 . ...
4. For every additional 1000 TV homes, formerly able to view both the local
station and another, which subscribe to a CATV carrying the local station with
average duplication, the local station's annual revenue is reduced by a mininum of $2,900 . ...
5. One additional half hour of prime time duplication per week above present average levels reduces local station annual revenue by $380 for every 1000
CATV subscribers. This is the equivalent of about 1.6 percent of average net
profits for the smaller stations.
Id. at 1-2.
67. Id. at 99.
68. M. Seiden, An Economic Analysis of Community Antenna Television Systems
and the Television Broadcasting Industry, Feb. 12, 1965. This report is a broad survey
of the cable industry and its effects on broadcasting together with the author's recommendations for regulatory action.

69. Id. at 4.
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more direct economic impact would develop. 70 He nevertheless pointed out
that the competition of additional television stations was a more serious
threat to existing stations than CATV. 71 Therefore, he cautioned that "economic protection alone cannot be the basis of restricting CATV operations
if the Commission continues, as it should, to encourage the growth of the
television broadcasting industry which could have a greater economic im' 72
pact on existing broadcasters than CATV.
Although Seiden's report recommended that the FCC require nonduplication and local station carriage by CATV systems, 73 the report indicated
that the emergence of CATV was merely the result of the Commission's
allocation and assignment plans which had left 16 million families unable to
receive the three networks off-the-air. 74 Accordingly, the report recommended that this underlying cause of the CATV problem be remedied by
75
increasing the number of three-station markets.
When the FCC formally adopted rules affecting microwave-served CATV
70. Seiden explained the basis of this prediction by stating:
In the future, as CATV data improve and knowledge of this subject becomes
more widespread, a more direct economic impact will develop. Thus, the extension of the audience of larger market stations by means of CATV will bring
audience duplication. The use of small stations will become redundant since
the penetration of small-station markets by CATV will reduce the value of the
local broadcaster as a means of reaching the smalltown audience. These
smaller markets will be reached through the big-city stations via CATV. This
situation has already begun to develop.
Id.
71. Id. at 72-73. Seiden showed that the impact of a CATV system is not as great
as the impact of a new broadcaster in small markets. The CATV system will affect
"a relatively small proportion of the broadcaster's audience," but when a new broadcaster
enters an area the entire broadcast audience is affected. Id.
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id. at 6. Seiden reasoned that:
Nonduplication provides protection to broadcasters in one- and two-station
markets by reducing the distraction of the viewing audience and permitting
these broadcasters to assert temporary jurisdiction over the better network programs. .

.

. Compulsory carriage ameliorates the effect of the CATV to the

extent that its subscribers would not be a total loss to the local broadcaster.
id.
74. Id. at 89.
75. To implement this policy, the coverage area of the 172 1- and 2-station television markets operating in the continental United States should be expanded
to the point that the potential audience in each case is sufficiently large to support 3 stations superimposed on the same general area. This will eliminate the
chronic problems of marginal stations which have plagued the Commission
over the years-essentially by expanding most of these broadcasters out of
their undersized audience.
Id. at 7.
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systems, it asserted jurisdiction over all CATV systems, 76 and announced its
intention to extend the exercise of its newly discovered authority to nonmicrowave CATV systems in the future. The Commission's immediate exercise
of jurisdiction over microwave-served CATV was premised on its finding
that the basic conditions under which CATV competed with open-circuit
television were unfair when compared to the conditions under which television stations competed with one another; 77 that CATV serves the public
interest when it supplements, rather than replaces, off-the-air television service, and that although it was impossible to accurately state the precise effects
of CATV on existing and potential television stations, these effects were
serious enough to warrant protective rulemaking, particularly in light of
78
CATV's "explosive" growth since the FCC's 1959 Report and Order.
Regarding CATV impact on existing and future broadcast station operations,
the Commission said:
In both instances, we stress, the question is not only whether
CATV competition may destroy or prevent the establishment of
stations (and thus frustrate achievement of the "fair, efficient, and
equitable" distribution of both local and nonlocal television service
contemplated by section 307(b) of the Communications Act), but
also whether it may seriously impair the ability of stations fully to
serve the needs and interests of their communities.79
The rules which the Commission adopted were substantially the same as
those proposed several years earlier, and provided that a microwave-served
CATV system must, at the request of local stations, carry such stations on
76. 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). The FCC rejected arguments that it was exceeding its
statutory authority and found the Carter Mountain decision to be dispositive. Id. at
687 n.5. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company had argued that Carter
Mountain was not dispositive in cases in which "a common carrier serving the public
generally with a wide variety of communications services also offers microwave service
to a CATV system." The Commission stated, however:
The essential point is that, in the cases with which we are concerned, microwave facilities subject to a license under the public interest standard of the
Communications Act are being used to transmit television broadcast signals
. . . to a user who in turn distributes those signals to members of the public.
Id.
77. Id. at 701-06. The Commission stated that this was not the usual competitive
situation because broadcasters "must . . . obtain access to the product in the program
distribution market, with its various restrictions and conditions [while] [t]he CATV operator need not enter this market at all." Id. at 704.
78. Id. at 685, 706-13. Although the FCC indicated in its rulemaking decision that
it would not and did not rely on the Fisher Report conclusions as to "the dollar effects of CATV competition and their significance in different settings," id. at 710, the
Commission lauded the work as "a substantial advance toward the goal of isolating and
predicting the effects of CATV competition .... "Id.
79. Id. at 707.
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their usual channel positions without material degradation, and afford them
15 days before-and-after protection against duplication of their programming.8 0 The FCC believed the imposition of the mandatory carriage and
nonduplication rules was "required in order to ameliorate the adverse impact
of CATV competition upon local stations, existing and potential." 81
Rules affecting all CATV systems were adopted by the FCC a year
later. 82 The Commission considered and rejected various arguments that it
had no statutory authority over CATV, concluding that CATV systems are
engaged in interstate communication by wire and thus within sections
2(a) and 3(a) of the Communications Act. 8 3 The Commission found
that it was empowered to promulgate regulations to carry out the provisions
of sections 1, 307(b), and 303(s) of the Act 84 "and to prevent frustration of
the regulatory scheme by CATV operations, whether or not microwave
facilities are used." 85 Additionally, the Commission stated that, in light of
the rapid growth of CATV, it was statutorily bound to act in the proposed
areas to "end the unwarranted distinction between microwave and nonmicrowave systems," and to effectuate the rules -prior to the disposition of
pending CATV applications.86
On the basis of the increasing threat posed to open circuit television by
CATV systems, the FCC made the following rules applicable to all CATVs:
(1) Within the limits of a CATV's channel capacity, local stations must be
87
carried at their request without degradation of quality;
(2) Upon request, a CATV system must avoid duplication of the programs
80. Id. at 741-46. Early cases in which these rules were applied are Minnesota Microwave, Inc., 38 F.C.C. 773 (1965) and Black Hills Video Corp., 38 F.C.C. 1323
(1965). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the FCC's right to attach such conditions to microwave grants even when the
microwave operations are contained in a single state, where transmission of the signals
crosses a state line. Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81. 38 F.C.C. at 713.
82. Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 153(a) (1970).
84. Id. §§ 151, 307(b), 303(s).
85. 2 F.C.C.2d at 733-34.
86. Id. at 745.
87. Id. at 752-56. The CATV systems were granted an exemption from carrying the
signal of a local station if
(1) that station's network programming was substantially duplicated by one or
more stations of higher priority, and
(2) carrying it would, because of limited channel capacity, prevent the station
from carrying the signal of an independent commercial station or a noncommercial educational station.
Id. at 753.
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of local television stations carried on the system during the same day that
such programs are broadcast by the local stations; ss
(3) No CATV system can import a distant signal into any of the 100
largest television markets "except upon a showing made in an evidentiary
hearing that such operation would be consistent with the public interest, and
particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of UHF television
89
broadcast service";
(4) CATV operators must file with the FCC information regarding
system size and ownership, as well as stations carried and "the extent of any
existing or proposed program origination by each CATV system." 90
The FCC's formal assumption of jurisdiction over CATV and the issuance
of restrictive rules in 1965 and 1966 was based on the probable economic injury inflicted by CATV on open-circuit television broadcasting, despite the
Commission's euphemistic use of the terms "economic impact" and "fair
competition" instead of "economic injury" and "television protectionism."
The agency persistently viewed cable as a mere auxiliary or supplementary
service whose growth, unfettered by FCC supervision, would bring about "a
system half wire, half free, which is destructive of the larger goals of
additional networks, additional outlets for local expression, and which
provides increased service to some in the city at the expense of those in the
91
rural area or those who cannot afford to pay. '
Since 1966 the FCC has placed additional burdens on cable development. 92 While some of the rules sought to compensate for previous overregulation, each new major codification added more hardships than it
relieved. 93 Despite recurring moves toward relief for CATV, 94 the federal
agency is headed in the general direction of increased preemption of local
and state authority, coupled with the imposition of still greater burdens on
cable systems through rules characterized by one former Commissioner as "a
88. Id. at 746. It should be noted that this same-day nonduplication provision was a
relaxation of the former 15-day before-and-after prohibition of duplication. The new
rules also allowed duplication of a local station's monochrome telecasts on another channel broadcasting the same program in color. Id. at 750-51. The current exclusivity rule
has undergone further change. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.91-.159 (1974).
89. 2 F.C.C.2d at 782. The FCC thus shifted its regulatory emphasis from protecting
small market telecasters to keeping cable from openly competing with stations in the
large markets.
90. Id. at 765.
91. Id. at 788-89.
92. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 76.1-.617 (1974).
93. See p. 855-56 & nn.6-8 supia.
94. See, e.g., Lid Is Off on Cable Rebuild Date, BROADCAST1NG, July 14, 1975, at 22.
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patchwork of protectionism." 95 The net effect of FCC policy has been to
keep the cable industry in a state of disequilibrium and defensiveness, while
the stability of the broadcasting industry has been artificially bolstered
through regulations designed to deter CATV encroachment. At the same
time it cannot be said that the policy has achieved "the larger goals of
additional networks, [and] additional [broadcast] outlets for local expression." 96
IV.

CONCLUSION

If, as the FCC has often proclaimed, competition is our national policy in
broadcasting, then the Commission's assumption and restrictive exercise of

jurisdiction over cable television is explicable only if the agency is, indeed,
the captive of the broadcasting industry it is supposed to regulate. However,
as the Supreme Court has pointed out, "[t]he very fact that Congress has
seen fit to enter into the comprehensive regulation of communications embodied in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion
that national policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications." 97
This being the case, the FCC is compelled by statute to determine the nature
and extent of competition that serves the public interest in broadcasting, and
when competitive effects produce detriment to the public interest, the public
interest controls. 98
Unrestrained by -the federal regulatory scheme that evolved in the last 10
years, CATV might have eventually replaced conventional over-the-air television broadcasting as the dominant mass medium, providing the nation with a
"television of abundance" 9 9 while freeing television broadcast spectrum
allocations for other purposes. The nation has already been wired twiceonce for electric power distribution and again for telephone communication.
The FCC chose to act on the assumption that cable would not extend
coverage to sparsely settled regions of the country, and then made its
prophecy self-fulfilling by denying to cable the opportunity to build the
economic foundation from which service could be spread to the hinterlands.
To be more charitable, if the odds against CATV serving low population
95. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 311 (1972)

(Johnson,

Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 788 (1965).
97. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953).
98. See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
99. See generally, SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE:

TIE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971).

The Sloan Commission on Cable Communi-

cations was established by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 1970.
to assess the potential of cable television.

Its purpose was
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density areas were high, the Commission's regulatory program made them
higher. In so doing, the FCC, without clear statutory authority from Congress, began to regulate the new cable medium more closely and restrictively
than it did the broadcast medium it was established to regulate under the
Communications Act. 100
It is as untrue as it is unkind to characterize the FCC as the broadcasting
industry's "captive"; the Commission is more the "father" of broadcasters.
CATV was someone else's child which the FCC could not ignore because
cable was making the agency's own children unhappy and perhaps even
sickly, though proof of the latter was difficult to establish. Cable was hardly
the only external threat against which the Commission paternalistically
protected its progeny; over-the-air subscription television was authorized
under such restrictive conditions 10 ' that no pay television station operates to
this day, and effective public participation in Commission licensing proceed10 2
ings was discouraged like the plague.
One can admire a parent who so assiduously protects his children from
harm, but the FCC has been anything but diligent in other aspects of child
rearing. It has failed to require that broadcasters provide even a fraction of
the opportunity for access it mandated for cable, 03 and for the most part, it
permits television stations to operate as they see fit and to determine for
themselves what is in the public interest. 10 4 It has neither assessed the
relationship between competition and the public interest within broadcast100. The Supreme Court has twice upheld the Commission's authority to regulate
CATV. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Court
upheld the FCC's jurisdiction over CATV but added that "the authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting." Id. at 178. In United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649
(1972), the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that the FCC's 1969 rule requiring CATV
systems with more than 3,500 subscribers to originate programming was consistent with
the "reasonably ancillary" doctrine of Southwestern. Id. at 662. The rule was subsequently rescinded. Report and Order in Docket No. 19988, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
101. See Fourth Report and Order on Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C.2d 466
(1968).
102. Cases which have overruled the Commission's handling of public attempts to
intervene in licensing proceedings are Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
103. See, e.g., Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).

104. See Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291 (1960).
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ing,'10 nor attempted to reconcile its protective acts on broadcasting's behalf
in the absence of profit limits' 0 6 and clear, enforced service standards for
broadcasters. The FCC is thus a permissive as well as a protective parent
when it comes to competition in the broadcast field.
This situation is to the liking of -the children, for broadcasters enjoy the
benefits of exercising valuable rights with relatively few responsibilities. They can occupy a protected channel and squeeze out as many dollars
from it as "free enterprise" will allow, comforted by the knowledge that their
benevolent parent will ward off interlopers as they arise.' 0 7 They enjoy
unregulated profit at the same time that they are insulated from potentially
effective competitors such as CATV. This is assumed by the Commission to
serve the public interest. In terms of the metaphor, however, it is nurturing
brats.
If "[t]he ability of a regulatory commission to protect or to promote a
technical innovation that challenges the regulated (and sometimes sheltered)
industry is a measure of the vitality and strength of that agency,"' 108 then
surely the FCC died a long time ago. Future generations will come to regard
the Commission's handling of cable as a major failure of public policy formulation and administration in telecommunications, and one that is symptomatic of the agency's general ineptitude in regulating competition.

105. See Kahn, supra n.57, at 198-201.
106. See Kahn, The Quasi-Utility Basis for Broadcast Regulation, 18 J. BROADCASTING
259 (1974).
107. The broadcasters may even rejoice when an interloper comes to the Commission's attention, for they know that their parent will be far too busy with the invader
to control his own brood. In the case of CATV, the FCC actually adopted the newcomer because that was the best way to control its adverse influence on the broadcasters. With "daddy" so occupied attending to the unloved adopted child, the adored natural children received even less of the father's limited supervision than otherwise might
have been the case.
108. See E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 20
(1973).

